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QUESTIONS PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The following questions are presented in this appeal: 
1. Did the District Court err in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Sellers on Buyers' claims for fraud in the 
inducement and negligent misrepresentation in the business purchase 
transaction when Sellers warranted and represented to Buyers in the 
purchase contract: 
With knowledge, and buyer may rely on the same 
to enter into this transaction. . . . That 
there are no known . . . litigation 
proceedings against seller . . . , 
and Sellers admitted they knew of pending litigation at the time of 
sale and intentionally failed to disclose that fact to Buyers? 
2. Did the District Court err in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Broker on Buyers' claims for fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation in the business purchase transaction 
when there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that 
Broker induced Sellers to not disclose pending litigation and to 
warrant and represent "[t]hat there are no known. . . litigation 
proceedings against the seller"? 
3. Did the District Court err in granting summary 
judgment on Sellers' counterclaim for breach of the purchase 
contract when Sellers represented to Buyers in the purchase 
contract: 
With knowledge, and buyer may rely on the same 
to enter into this transaction. . . . That 
there are no known . . . litigation 
proceedings against seller . . . , 
1 
and Sellers admitted they knew of pending litigation at the time of 
sale and intentionally failed to disclose that fact to Buyers? 
4. Did the District Court err in granting summary 
judgment on Broker's counterclaim for attorney fees pursuant to 
indemnity provision in the purchase contract when there was 
evidence that Broker knew about the existence of pending litigation 
in violation of the express representation in the purchase contract 
and induced the Sellers not to disclose that fact to Buyers? 
In reviewing this appeal from the lower court's granting 
of summary judgment motions against Buyers, all facts and 
reasonable inferences therefrom are to be drawn in Buyers' favor, 
and the trial court's ruling is accorded no deference. E .g. , Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636-637 (Utah 1989); 
Neiderhauser Builders. & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 
1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellants Donald M. Dudley and Ruf, Inc. appeal from 
final judgments of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, entered on motions for 
summary judgment in favor of Appellees Iceland Investment, Inc., 
Robert Johnson, and VR Utah, Inc. d/b/a VR Business Brokers. This 
Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-3 (j) (1997) . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of Facts.1 
1. On or about September 12, 1990 Appellants Ruf, Inc. 
as buyer and Donald M. Dudley as guarantor (hereinafter "Buyers") 
agreed to purchase the assets of a business from Appellee Icelandic 
Investments, Inc. f/k/a USA Swings for a total purchase price of 
$82,546.00 (hereinafter "Purchase Transaction"). [R2 & 10-60]2 
2. Appellee Robert Johnson was the president of 
Icelandic Investments, Inc. f/k/a USA Swings (hereinafter 
collectively "Sellers"). [Rl, 21 & 80] 
3. Defendant VR Utah, Inc. d/b/a VR Business Brokers 
(hereinafter "Broker") is a brokerage firm which brokered the 
transaction between the buyers and sellers. [Rl-2 & 71] Broker 
received $10,452 in commission at the closing of the Purchase 
Transaction. [R434 at U 10] 
4. The Purchase Transaction was memorialized in the 
Agreement for Sale of Assets, dated September 12, 1990 (hereinafter 
"Purchase Transaction Agreement") [R10-60] which was signed by, 
inter alia, Icelandic Investments, Inc., Ruf, Inc., Donald M. 
Dudley, and Robert Johnson, individually. [R21] 
1
 As this is an appeal from the lower court's granting of 
summary judgment motions against Buyers, all facts and reasonable 
inferences therefrom are to be drawn in Buyers' favor. E.g., Blue 
Cross Sc Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636-637 (Utah 1989); 
Neiderhauser Builders. & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 
1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2
 All citations are to the record as indexed by the Clerk 
of the Third Judicial District Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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5. In connection with the Purchase Transaction it was 
expressly represented: 
The SELLER warrants and represents to BUYER 
with knowledge, and BUYER may rely on the same 
to enter into this transaction each and all of 
the following: 
5. That there are no known governmental, 
administrative, or litigation proceedings against SELLER, 
which have arisen in connection with its conduct of the 
business. 
[R4, 15-16, 436] (emphases added) 
6. This representation was material to Buyers because, 
inter alia, their financing source for purchase and operation of 
the business was contingent on there being no litigation against 
the business. [R5-7, 853-854, 864-870, 1167-1172] 
7. This representation was false. Before entering into 
this Purchase Transaction, Seller Icelandic had been made a party 
to litigation brought by Associated Factors, Inc. and captioned 
Associated Factors, Inc. v. Rainbow Custom Fibers, et al. , Civil 
No. 87-02843, pending in the Third District Court of Salt Lake 
County (hereinafter "Associated Factors Lawsuit"). [R435, 742, 
830, 1565] Associated Factors was seeking to recover from Seller 
Icelandic the sum of $88,798.50 plus punitive damages, interest and 
attorney's fees. [R438] 
8. Appellee Johnson knew about the Associated Factors 
Lawsuit pending against the Seller Icelandic and told Broker about 
the litigation prior to the Purchase Transaction. [R435-436, 742 
at n. 1, 831, 1553] 
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9. Neither Seller Icelandic nor Mr. Johnson disclosed 
the pendency of the Associated Factors Lawsuit to Buyers and Buyers 
were not aware of the lawsuit at the time of the Purchase 
Transaction and the execution of the Purchase Transaction 
Agreement. [R4, 439, 742, 830] 
10. Broker did not disclose the pendency of the 
Associated Factors Lawsuit to Buyers and, in fact, Broker persuaded 
the Seller Icelandic and Appellee Johnson not to disclose the 
pendency of the litigation. [R742, 831, 1200-1201, 1248-1250, 
1360-1363] 
11. Buyers did not learn of the pendency of the 
litigation until the following year. [R743] On October 10, 1991 
Buyer Ruf, Inc. was named in an amended complaint by Associated 
Factors seeking recovery from Ruf in the amount of $88,798.50 plus 
punitive damages, interest and attorney fees. [R831, 864-894] The 
amount sought in this litigation was more than the entire purchase 
price in the Purchase Transaction Agreement. [R10-12] 
12. Revelation and disclosure of the lawsuit caused 
Buyers to lose their funding source, and a funding commitment of 
$150,000.00. [R5, 853-856, 864-869] 
13 . Upon learning they had been defrauded with regard to 
litigation against the business, the Buyers on September 23, 1991 
sent Sellers a written notice of rescission of the Purchase 
Transaction. [R438, 628, 868] 
5 
14. On November 11, 19 91 Buyer Ruf, Inc. , by and through 
its counsel, filed an Answer to the Associated Factors' Complaint. 
[R868, 895-899] 
15. In June 1992, eight months after the rescission 
demand and more than a year and a half after the purchase 
transaction, the Associated Factors Lawsuit was settled. [R744, 
900-902] 
B. The Nature of the Case And The Course Of 
Proceedings And Disposition In The Lower Court. 
1. Claims and Counterclaims -- Buyers v. Broker. 
On July 21, 1993, Buyers brought this action against 
Broker asserting causes of action for Fraudulent Inducement to 
Contract and Negligent Misrepresentation. [Rl-9] Broker 
counterclaimed against Buyers asserting that Buyers breached the 
indemnity provision contained in paragraph XX of the Purchase 
Transaction Agreement. [R74-75, 82-84] Buyers, in their Answer to 
Broker's counterclaim on September 22, 1993, affirmatively asserted 
as their third defense: 
Any indemnification agreement signed by [Buyers] is 
subject to rescission given the conduct of [Sellers and 
Broker] as alleged in the Complaint, which allegations 
are hereby incorporated by reference as a further 
affirmative defense. [R96] 
2. Claims and Counterclaims -- Buyers v. Sellers 
Buyers also brought claims against Sellers for Fraudulent 
Inducement to Contract, Negligent Misrepresentation and Breach of 
Contract. [Rl-9] Sellers in turn counterclaimed against Buyers 
for $46,545.74, the unpaid portion of the sales price under the 
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Purchase Transaction Agreement. [R79-84] In their Answer to 
Sellers' counterclaim Buyers' again affirmatively asserted the 
following: 
The Note which is the subject of the Counterclaim is 
subject to rescission given the conduct of the [Sellers 
and Broker] as alleged in the Complaint which is 
incorporated by this reference. [R93] 
3. Broker's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On October 18, 1995, Broker moved the trial court for 
summary judgment on the grounds that Buyers expressly assumed by 
contract the risk of their damages, that Buyers released Brokers as 
to liability and that Buyers agreed not to sue Brokers for any 
damages resulting from the purchase of the business. [R234-35] 
Buyers responded to the motion for summary judgment and set forth 
evidence and argument that: 1) Broker was liable to Buyers for 
negligent misrepresentation; 2) Broker was liable to Buyers for 
fraudulent inducement; 3) The contract provision relied on by 
Broker should not be applied to exculpate Broker from its own 
fraud; and 4) The contract is voidable and Buyers were entitled 
to rescission. [R431-449] Broker's three-page argument filed on 
reply argued that Buyers failed to show a prima facie case of 
intentional or negligent misrepresentation and raised, for the 
first time, the argument that Buyers have not shown any damages to 
support their claims. [R495-500] 
On February 24, 1997, Broker's Motion for Summary 
Judgment came on for hearing before the trial court. On February 
26, 1997 the trial court issued its Minute Entry wherein it granted 
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Broker's Motion for Summary Judgment. In granting the Broker's 
summary judgment the trial court ruled in its Minute Entry3 as 
follows: 
[Broker's] Motion for Summary Judgment is based primarily 
on paragraph XX of the contract between the parties. 
Article XX says in pertinent part that buyer is relying 
solely on buyer's inspection of the business and the 
representations of the seller, and not on [broker's] with 
regard to the prior operating history of the business, 
the value of the assets being purchased, and all other 
material facts of seller in making this offer. The 
paragraph goes on to state that the broker hasn't 
verified and will not verify any representations of 
seller and if any representation should be untrue, buyer 
agrees to look solely to seller for relief, and to 
indemnify [broker] and hold broker harmless in connection 
with any losses or damages caused to buyer. 
In its response, the [buyer] seems to ignore the 
foregoing contractual provision, claiming that the 
[buyer] would not have entered into the contract, but for 
negligent or fraudulent misrepresentations by the seller 
and [broker], and that therefore [buyer] is entitled to 
rescission and the terms of the contract don't matter. 
The [buyer's] arguments have no merit for several 
reasons. The agreement was signed by all the parties. 
The [buyer] testified in his deposition that he read the 
agreement thoroughly and understood it. [Buyer] , through 
paragraph XX, expressly assumed the risks regarding 
representations or misrepresentations of seller. By this 
provision, [buyer] expressly relieved [broker] of any 
legal duties arising from the described conduct, i.e., 
seller's representations or misrepresentations. 
. . . The [buyer] has simply failed to [show there is a 
genuine issue for trial]. With respect to the elements 
of fraudulent misrepresentation, there is no factual 
averment from the [buyer] establishing even arguable 
evidence of each of those elements. The same is true 
with respect to the elements of negligent 
3
 The Minute Entry is quoted herein as the trial court's 
Order, signed April 25, 1997, simply provides that "Defendant 
[Broker's] Motion for Summary Judgment is granted for the reasons 
set forth, in the detail, [sic] in the Court's Minute Entry dated 
February 26, 1997." [R693-695] 
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misrepresentation. [Buyer] has also failed to provide 
any evidence of damages. 
[Buyer's] action against [Broker] is barred by the terms 
of the contract, and [Buyers] have failed to meet their 
burden in response to [Broker's] Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
[R603-607]4 
4. Sellers' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On May 9, 1997, Sellers moved the trial court for summary 
judgment seeking dismissal of Buyers' claims against Sellers and 
judgment on Sellers' counterclaim. [R739-740] Sellers' Motion, 
while conceding the misrepresentation and nondisclosure of the 
pending litigation, argued they were entitled to summary judgment 
on two grounds: (1) They were not provided with a written notice 
of default with a 3 0-day opportunity to cure as set forth in 
Article VIII of the Purchase Transaction Agreement; and (2) There 
was no damage to Buyers resulting from the misrepresentation. 
[R740-749] 
In opposition to Sellers' summary judgment motion, Buyers 
submitted the affidavits of Donald M. Dudley and Wesley C. Dudley. 
[R864-870 & 853-857, respectively] . Donald Dudley testified, inter 
alia, that the lack of outstanding litigation against Sellers was 
extremely important to him and that he would not have entered into 
the Purchase Transaction Agreement or signed the promissory notes 
if that warranty was not in the agreement. [R866-867 at HU 4-6 & 
12] He testified further that upon disclosing the existing 
litigation against the business to Wesley Dudley, who was financing 
4
 Attached as Addendum "A". 
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the purchase and operation of the business and was Donald Dudley's 
only viable source of financing, Wesley Dudley refused to advance 
any further funds to finance the purchase or operation of the 
business and no other financing was available. [R866-867 at %^ 9 
& 10] Likewise, Wesley Dudley testified that he had required, as 
a condition to financing the business, that there be no litigation 
against the business. [R855 at K 8] He further testified that 
upon learning of the pending litigation against the business he 
would not loan any additional funds to Donald Dudley, and had there 
not been any litigation he was ready, willing and able to loan the 
additional $150,000 in capital he had committed to loan for the 
purpose of operating and expanding the business. [R855 at ^ 6-
10]5 
On October 20, 1997 the trial court entered an Order 
granting Sellers1 summary judgment motion dismissing Buyers1 
complaint and granting judgment against Buyers on Sellers1 
counterclaim in the amount of $89,006.31. [R1060-1062] While the 
trial court!s written order does not explain or set forth the 
court's reasoning or basis for its ruling, the court's ruling from 
the bench on August 4, 1997 explained it as follows: 
5
 Although Sellers never objected to the affidavits, Broker 
moved to strike these affidavits to the extent they pertained to 
the motion for new trial discussed below arguing that Buyers were 
"unreasonably dilatory in preparing and submitting these 
Affidavits". [R924-929] There was no evidentiary challenges to 
the affidavits or their contents. On August 6, 1997 the trial 
court granted this motion and struck the affidavits as they pertain 
to the motion for new trial. The trial court did not, however, 
strike them with respect to Sellers' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and no such motion was ever made. [R1021-1025] 
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And [Sellers'] motion for summary judgment is 
granted. 
And I think this was explained very well by Mr. 
Slaugh. When a party makes a motion for summary judgment 
and it is properly supported, the burden on the 
responding party is a lot greater than what [Buyers] have 
met in their response. 
When I said wishy-washy, Mr. Silvestrini -- and 
that's really what I was talking about -- Mr. Slaugh 
talked about clear and convincing evidence. It is clear 
to me from reading the affidavits and deposition that Mr. 
Dudley did not rely on it. He likes to talk about 
reliance, but he's got to bring to court admissible facts 
showing that we've got a case to try. . . . And the fact 
[sic] that the [Buyers] needed to bring to this Court to 
survive these motions simply were never even proffered. 
And that's absolutely true with the damage issue. That 
was raised. That was before the Court. And there hasn't 
been even an intimation regarding the kind of specific 
types of damages that would have to be raised again to 
survive this motion. [Buyers have] simply failed to make 
even a prima facie case of fraudulent inducement. It 
takes more than just evidence in the record. 
I think the contract provision regarding notice and 
cure is essential to any analysis of this case, and it is 
also clear that the [Buyers] completely ignored that 
provision. That provision was there for exactly this 
kind of case. And I think that cut right to the core for 
the argument for fraudulent inducement. Why is this 
provision in the contract if the parties didn't 
acknowledge that there are sometimes things 
misrepresented, omitted or even things that people don't 
know about that are not as everybody thought they were 
when they put together the list of representations at the 
start of a contract? 
[R1004] (emphases added)6 
5. Buyers' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. 
On February 25, 1997, prior to the Sellers' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and prior to the trial court's decision granting 
Broker's Motion for Summary Judgment, Buyers moved the trial court 
Attached as Addendum "B". 
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for leave to amend their complaint to add a claim for relief 
entitled "rescission and restitution". [R518-520, 586-602] This 
proposed amendment was to clear up any confusion regarding the fact 
that Buyers were seeking rescission as previously expressed in 
their letter dated September 23, 1991 which demanded rescission of 
the transaction, [R628] and as expressly pleaded at the outset of 
this litigation in defense to the counterclaims of both Sellers and 
Broker. [R93 & 96] The rescission claim was based on the same 
factual and legal basis as those contained in the initial complaint 
and, in fact, the factual allegations in the amended complaint were 
identical to those in the initial complaint. [592-602] 
On September 8, 1997 the trial court denied Buyers' 
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint "because it is untimely, is 
prejudicial to the defendants, and [Buyers] have offered no excuse 
for the delay in filing the same." [R1021-1024] 
6. Buyers' Motion For New Trial. 
On May 5, 1997, Buyers filed a "Motion for New Trial" 
asking the court to reconsider its ruling granting Broker's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. [R712-714] The Motion was based on the fact 
that there were material issues of disputed fact which precluded 
the entry of summary judgment and the trial court, as a matter of 
law, committed error in its ruling granting Broker's summary 
judgment motion. [R715-724] On September 8, 1997 the trial court 
denied Buyers' Motion for New Trial "on the grounds that this 
Court's Order of Summary Judgment in favor of [Broker] is, and was, 
correct and the Court made no error in law by granting [Broker's] 
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Motion for Summary Judgment." [R1021-1025] The court further 
awarded Broker $14,229.33 in attorney's fees under its indemnity 
counterclaim. [R1021-1025] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
against Buyers on their claims of fraud in the inducement and 
negligent misrepresentation against Sellers and Broker. There was 
record evidence establishing each of the elements of these claims 
against Sellers and Broker. More particularly, there was a 
material representation made by Sellers, with knowledge and at the 
insistence of the Broker (who failed to disclose the same), which 
was relied upon by Buyers and which caused substantial damage to 
Buyers. Accordingly, summary judgment should not have been granted 
on Buyers' claims against Sellers and Broker and the ruling should 
be reversed. 
The trial court further erred in granting summary 
judgment against Buyers on their claims against Sellers by 
improperly ruling that Buyers failed to comply with a Default 
provision which required that notice of a default and an 
opportunity to cure be given. It was error as the Default 
provision, which was obtained by fraud, was subject to rescission 
and therefore unenforceable. Moreover, even if enforceable the 
provision was inapplicable as the "default" was the existence of 
litigation against the Seller at the time of the Purchase 
Transaction, and such default could not be cured. Finally, Sellers 
actually knew of the default and yet the litigation continued 
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against the business (and later also Buyer Ruf, Inc.) for more than 
a year and a half after the Purchase Transaction Agreement was 
entered, and eight months after Buyers1 written notice of 
rescission detailing the fraudulent representation of Sellers. 
Thus, the unenforceable Default provision could not provide a basis 
for judgment in Sellers' favor as a matter of law or a matter of 
fact and the trial court's ruling should be reversed. 
The trial court further erred in granting summary 
judgment against Buyers on Sellers' counterclaim seeking the 
balance of the purchase price owing under the fraudulently induced 
Purchase Transaction Agreement. The evidence establishing fraud in 
the inducement committed by Sellers and Broker subjects the 
Agreement to rescission and negates Buyers' obligation to pay the 
balance under the Agreement (and entitles Buyers to be restored to 
the position they occupied prior to the Agreement). It was error, 
therefore, for the court to grant summary judgment on Sellers' 
counterclaim when the contract being enforced was induced by fraud. 
The trial court also erred in granting summary judgment 
against Buyers on Brokers' counterclaim for indemnification under 
the fraudulently induced Purchase Transaction Agreement. Utah law, 
as a matter of public policy, does not allow a party to contract 
for immunity from its own fraud and any such provision is void. 
Moreover, the provision is contained in the Purchase Transaction 
Agreement which is also unenforceable as a result of being 
fraudulently induced as discussed in the preceding paragraph. The 
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trial court's summary judgment in favor of Broker should therefore 
be reversed. 
Next, the trial court erred in refusing to allow Buyers 
to amend their complaint to clear up any confusion regarding the 
fact that Buyers were seeking rescission as previously expressed in 
their letter to Sellers at the time the fraud was discovered, and 
as asserted as affirmative defenses to the counterclaims of both 
Sellers and Broker. The amendment, which was proposed prior to 
Sellers' summary judgment motion and prior to the court's ruling on 
Broker's summary judgment motion, added no new factual issue or 
legal issues; therefore, the trial court's denial of Buyers' 
motion for leave to amend was error and that decision should be 
reversed. 
Finally, the trial court erred in denying Buyers' Motion 
for New Trial which sought reconsideration of the trial court's 
summary judgment ruling in favor of Broker which was contrary to 
law and which was based on an issue first raised by Broker in its 
reply memorandum to which Buyers had no opportunity to respond. 
Given the trial court's legal error and the existence of factual 
issues precluding the entry of summary judgment, the trial court 
should have granted Buyers' Motion for New Trial and reconsidered 
its decision. 
In sum, the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment on Buyers' claims for fraud in the inducement and 
negligent misrepresentation against both Sellers and Broker. 
Moreover, given the fraudulently induced agreement, the trial court 
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also erred in granting summary judgment against Buyers on the 
counterclaims of Sellers and Broker, both of which were based on 
the fraudulently induced agreement. Accordingly, the trial court's 
rulings granting summary judgment in favor of Sellers and Broker 
should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in dismissing Buyers' causes of 
action for against Sellers and Broker for fraud in the inducement 
and negligent misrepresentation as there was more than ample 
evidence in the record to create genuine issues of fact on each 
element of those claims. The trial court further erred in granting 
summary judgment against Buyers on the counterclaims of Sellers and 
Broker seeking to enforce the written contract given that Buyers 
had valid defenses to the contract which included fraud in the 
inducement and the right to rescission. Accordingly, the trial 
court's orders entering summary judgment against Buyers should be 
reversed and the case remanded. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
BUYERS' CLAIM OF FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT. 
A. TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTING BUYERS' 
FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT CLAIMS AGAINST BOTH SELLERS 
AND BROKER. 
Buyers' claim of fraud in the inducement asserted against 
both Sellers and Broker was improperly dismissed by the trial court 
as all elements of a fraud in the inducement claim were either 
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undisputed or were established by substantial record evidence 
making the grant of summary judgment inappropriate in this case. 
Summary judgment is proper only if, based on the 
undisputed evidence, there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. E.g. , Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 
93 6 (Utah 1979) . Moreover, all evidence and inferences to be drawn 
from the evidence are considered in a light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, the Buyers in this case, and the trial court's 
ruling is accorded no deference. E.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. 
State, 779 P.2d 634, 636-637 (Utah 1989); Neiderhauser Builders. 
& Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
The Buyers must prove the following six elements to 
establish their fraud in the inducement claim: 
1. That the defendant made a false or misleading 
statement; and 
2. That the defendant either knew the statement was 
false or misleading, or that the defendant made it 
with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity; 
and 
3. That the statement was of material fact; and 
4. That the defendant made the statement with the 
intent that the plaintiff would rely on the false 
or misleading representation; and 
5. That the plaintiff reasonably relied on the false 
or misleading representation; and 
6. That the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of 
relying on the false representation. 
E.g., Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1990); Pace 
v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, 274-275 (1952). 
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The record evidence before the trial court clearly demonstrated the 
Buyers' ability to establish each of these elements against both 
Sellers and Broker and summary judgment was improper. 
1. The Representation That There Were No Pending 
Litigation Matters And The Failure To Disclose The 
Existing Litigation Was False And The First Element 
Was Satisfied. 
There can be no dispute about the Sellers' false 
representation. The Sellers expressly represented in the Purchase 
Transaction Agreement as follows: 
The seller . . . represents to buyer . . . 
that there are no known . . . litigation 
proceedings against seller. . . . 
This was a statement of a presently existing material fact which 
was false because, as Sellers admitted in their pleadings before 
the trial court, the Associated Factors Lawsuit was pending against 
the Seller at the time the Purchase Transaction Agreement was 
executed. Additionally, Sellers admitted this false representation 
in their Memorandum in support of their Motion for Summary 
Judgment: "[Sellers] did not disclose to [Buyers] the pendency of 
the Associated Factors Lawsuit." [R742] 
With respect to the Broker, the evidence before the trial 
court further established that Appellee Johnson knew about the 
Associated Factors Lawsuit pending against the Seller Icelandic and 
told Broker about the litigation prior to the Purchase Transaction. 
[R435-436, 742 at n. 1, 831, 1553] Thereafter, the Broker not 
only failed to disclose to Buyers the pendency of the Associated 
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Factors Lawsuit but also persuaded the Sellers not to disclose 
the pendency of the litigation. [R742, 831, 1200-1201, 1248-1250, 
1360-1363] 
2. Defendants Knew Their Representation That There Was 
No Litigation Proceedings Against Seller Was False 
And The Second Element Was Satisfied. 
Both the Sellers and the Broker knew the representation 
in the Purchase Transaction Agreement that there were no known 
litigation proceedings against the Seller was false. The Sellers 
were parties to the litigation and admitted knowing the litigation 
was pending at the time of the Purchase Transaction Agreement. 
Further, the Broker had knowledge as the evidence established that 
the Sellers disclosed the Associated Factors Lawsuit to the Broker 
who promptly induced them not to disclose it to the buyers. [R742, 
831, 1200-1201, 1248-1250, 13 60-13 63] 
3. The False Representation That There Were No Known 
Litigation Proceedings Against Seller Was Material 
And The Third Element Was Satisfied. 
A fact is material if it is "something which a buyer or 
seller of ordinary intelligence and prudence would think to be of 
some importance in determining whether to buy or sell." S & F 
Supply Co. v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah 1974) . Obviously 
pending litigation against an entity one is purchasing is something 
7
 Under Utah law, a real estate agent owes a duty to 
prospective purchasers to act honestly, ethically and competently, 
and is answerable at law for breaches of his or her statutory duty 
to the public. E.g. , Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 
1980)(citing Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 802, 805 
(1962)). Thus, real estate agents hired by vendors are liable to 
purchasers under the torts of fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation. Id. 
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which an ordinary buyer would deem to be important and is, thus, 
material. Moreover, the parties stipulated in the Purchase 
Transaction Agreement that the representation was material by 
expressly agreeing that "buyer may rely on the same to enter into 
this transaction. . . . " Thus, by definition the representation 
was material. 
The evidence before the trial court further established 
the materiality of the misrepresentation by showing the following: 
(1) That the lack of outstanding litigation against Sellers was 
extremely important to Buyers and that they would not have entered 
into the Purchase Transaction Agreement or signed the corresponding 
promissory notes if that warranty was not in the agreement [R866-
867 at mi 4-6 & 12] ; (2) That when the Buyers disclosed the 
existing litigation against the business to Wesley Dudley, who was 
financing the purchase and operation and was Buyers' only viable 
source of financing, Wesley Dudley refused to advance any further 
funds to finance the purchase or operation of the business and no 
other financing was available [R866-867 at UK 9 & 10] ; (3) That the 
Buyers' financing source had required, as a condition to financing 
the purchase and operation of the business, that there be no 
litigation against the business [R855 at U 8]; and (4) That upon 
learning of the pending litigation against the business Buyers 
could not obtain the additional $150,000 in funding which Buyers' 
funding source was ready, willing and able to loan had the 
contingency that there be no litigation against the Seller be 
satisfied. [R855 at HH 6-10] 
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4. Defendants' Intent That Buyers Rely On The 
Representation Was Stipulated And The Fourth 
Element Was Satisfied. 
The parties expressly agreed in the Purchase Transaction 
Agreement that "BUYER may rely on the [representation] to enter 
into this transaction. . . . " [R15-16] Moreover, it was fully 
expected Buyers would rely on the representation otherwise there 
was no reason to withhold the information from Buyers. Thus, it 
was contemplated and even expressly intended that Buyers rely on 
the representation that there was no litigation pending against 
Seller at the time of the Purchase Transaction. 
5. Buyers Reasonably Relied Upon The False 
Representation And The Fifth Element Was Satisfied. 
There is record evidence that the lack of outstanding 
litigation against Sellers was extremely important to Buyers and 
that they would not have entered into the Purchase Transaction 
Agreement or signed the promissory notes if that warranty was not 
in the agreement. [E.g., R432-440, 866-867 at KU 4-6 & 12] In 
other words, the Buyers actually relied upon the representation. 
The evidence and circumstances of this case further show 
that the reliance was reasonable. As discussed above, the parties 
expressly stipulated that Buyers could rely on the representation 
indicating that they contemplated that such reliance would occur, 
and would be reasonable. Moreover, representations that there are 
no pending lawsuits are typically included in purchase contracts 
and material information upon which a reasonable buyer would (and 
should) rely. Finally, the fact that the Sellers and Broker 
carefully concealed the litigation from the Buyers so the purchase 
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would take place erases any question that Buyers1 reliance was 
reasonable. 
6. Buyers Suffered Damages As A Result Of The False 
Representation And The Sixth And Final Element Was 
Satisfied.b 
Buyers were clearly damaged by the existence of the 
Associated Factors Lawsuit pending against the entity purchased by 
Buyers. The fundamental damage arises from the simple fact that an 
entity embroiled in litigation is worth less than the entity Buyers 
thought they were purchasing based on Defendants' representation, 
namely an entity not involved in litigation. Under no 
circumstances would the value of these two entities be the same 
and, as a result, Buyers were damaged as they received an entity 
worth less because of the litigation. 
Buyers were further damaged as it is undisputed that, as 
shown by the evidence, Buyers lost their funding source as a direct 
and proximate result of this fraud. This evidence established that 
Buyers' financing for the Purchase Transaction was contingent on 
there being no pending litigation against the Seller and when it 
came to light that there was pending litigation despite the 
representation to the contrary, the lender withdrew future funding. 
[R5-7, 853-854, 864-870, 1167-1172] Further, Buyers incurred 
8
 This element of Buyers' fraud in the inducement claim is 
not at issue with respect to the Broker's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as the issue of damages was not raised by Broker until its 
reply memorandum. Accordingly, the damages element must be 
presumed satisfied with respect to Broker's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. In any event, the evidence showing that Buyers were 
damaged by the misrepresentation satisfies the damages element with 
respect to both Broker and Sellers. 
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damage when, in September, 19 91, Buyer Ruf, Inc. was added as a 
defendant in the Associated Factors Lawsuit and had to retain 
counsel to defend itself in that substantial litigation.9 [R437-
438, 830] 
Clearly the foregoing demonstrates there was sufficient 
evidence of damages to preclude summary judgment. In order to 
avoid summary judgment a party need not establish its damage claim 
with precision, but need only demonstrate they can produce evidence 
that would reasonably support a finding in their favor on this 
issue. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 
1991); Kranz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352, 353 & 356 (Utah 1991). Thus, 
the trial court's entry of summary judgment against Buyers on their 
fraud in the inducement claim was error. 
B. TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS 
THE DEFAULT PROVISION IN THE PURCHASE TRANSACTION 
AGREEMENT WAS NEITHER ENFORCEABLE NOR APPLICABLE. 
In granting Sellers' Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
trial court's decision centered on the Default provision set forth 
as Article VIII of the Purchase Transaction Agreement.10 The 
3
 The Associated Factors Lawsuit was substantial litigation 
as Associated Factors was seeking to recover from Buyer Ruf, Inc. 
the sum of $88,798.50 plus punitive damages, interest and 
attorney's fees. [R474 & 478] The amount sought in the Associated 
Factors Lawsuit exceeded the entire purchase price under the 
Purchase Transaction Agreement. [R10-12] 
10
 That provision provides in pertinent part: 
In the event any party to this Agreement defaults on any 
term or provision incorporated herein, including any provision of 
any Exhibit attached hereto, the nondefaulting party shall give the 
defaulting party a written notice requiring that such default be 
cured within thirty (30) days after receipt of said written 
notice. . . . After such period, the nondefaulting parties may 
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trial court erred in basing its ruling on this Default provision 
and finding that Buyers had no remedy against Sellers because they 
did not provide written notice to Sellers and allow them to cure 
the defect. The court's ruling in this regard is flawed both 
legally and factually. 
1. The Default Provision Is Not Enforceable As The 
Agreement Was Induced By Fraud. 
As a matter of law, a contract induced by a fraudulent 
misrepresentation of existing material fact is subject to 
rescission at the election of the defrauded party. E.g., American 
Scale Mfg. Co. v. Zee, 235 P.2d 361, 363 (Utah 1951); Conder v. 
A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) ("plaintiff in an action for fraud has the option to elect to 
rescind the transaction and recover the purchase price or to affirm 
the transaction and recover damages")(citing Dugan v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980)); Perkins v. Coombs, 769 P.2d 269, 271 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988)(same and noting the choice of remedy belongs 
to defrauded party); Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304, 307-308 (Utah 
1979)(same). The undisputed evidence establishes that Buyers were 
fraudulently induced to enter into the Purchase Transaction and, 
upon learning of the fraud, immediately issued a written notice of 
rescission. 
Additionally, the Sellers sought (and the trial court 
obliged) the enforcement and protection of a contractual provision 
take the remedies set forth in this Agreement and any attachments 
hereto. . . .[R15] 
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which was obtained by an affirmative and material misrepresentation 
that no litigation existed. A party to a contract cannot obtain a 
contractual provision by fraud and then seek to hide behind the 
protection of the provision when challenged with the fraud. As the 
Utah Supreme Court has expressly stated: 
The law does not permit a covenant of immunity which will 
protect a person against his own fraud on the grounds of 
public policy. A contract limitation on damages or 
remedies is valid only in the absence of allegations or 
proof of fraud. 
Ong Int'l (USA), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 
1993)(emphasis added). Thus, as a matter of law the fraudulently 
induced default provision is not a defense to Buyers' claims; 
therefore, the court erred in relying on this provision and 
granting summary judgment in favor of Sellers. 
2. The "Default" Could Not Be Cured And The Default 
Provision Is Inapplicable. 
Even if the law were ignored and the obligations and 
limitations set forth in the Default provision were somehow 
enforceable, the Default provision has no application as the 
"default" (i.e., the misrepresentation) could not be cured. The 
"default" was the existence of litigation against the Seller at the 
time of the Purchase Transaction despite Sellers1 express 
representation to the contrary. This default simply could not be 
cured -- the litigation was in existence at the time of purchase. 
Accordingly, the Default provision allowing the cure of a default 
is not applicable as Sellers could not cure this defect brought 
about by their blatant fraud. 
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3. The Default Provision Does Not Provide Protection 
For Sellers As They Had Notice Of The Default. 
The purpose of the Default provision was to provide the 
defaulting party with notice so they could effectively cure the 
breach. The undisputed evidence in this case establishes, however, 
the Sellers had actual notice of the default at the time they 
signed the Purchase Transaction Agreement. Despite this actual 
notice the Associated Factors Lawsuit was not settled for more than 
a year and a half after the parties entered into the Purchase 
Transaction Agreement. Moreover, even if actual knowledge of the 
default does not satisfy the technical requirement of the Default 
provision, the undisputed evidence shows that on September 23, 1991 
Buyers sent Sellers a written notice of rescission of the Purchase 
Transaction identifying the outstanding litigation as the basis. 
[R438, 628, 868] Clearly this letter satisfied the written notice 
requirement of the Default provision. Despite this notice, 
however, the Associated Factors Lawsuit was not settled until June, 
1992, more than eight (8) months after the notice. Thus, even if 
the Default provision were somehow enforceable and the default was 
curable, the undisputed evidence shows that Sellers did not "cure" 
the default within the thirty (3 0) period as required under the 
Default provision. Thus, the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Sellers was reversible error on this basis as 
well. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
BUYERS' CLAIM OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. 
A. TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTING BUYERS' 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS AGAINST BOTH 
SELLERS AND BROKER. 
Buyers' claim of negligent misrepresentation asserted 
against both Sellers and Broker was improperly dismissed by the 
trial court as all elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim 
were either undisputed or were established by substantial record 
evidence making the grant of summary judgment inappropriate in this 
case. 
The Buyers must prove the following six elements to 
establish their negligent misrepresentation claim: 
(1) Defendant had a pecuniary interest in the 
transaction; 
(2) Defendant was in a superior position to know 
material facts; 
(3) Defendant carelessly or negligently made a false 
representation concerning them; 
(4) Defendant expected the other party to rely and act 
thereon; 
(5) Plaintiff reasonably relied thereon; and 
(6) Plaintiff suffered loss in that transaction. 
E .a. , Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 
302, 305 (Utah 1993). 
The record evidence before the trial court clearly demonstrated the 
Buyers1 ability to establish each of these elements against both 
Sellers and Broker and summary judgment was improper. 
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1. Sellers And Broker Had A Pecuniary Interest In The 
Purchase Transaction And The First Element Was 
Satisfied. 
There is no dispute that the Sellers were to receive the 
purchase price and the Broker received a commission in excess of 
$10,000 in connection with the Purchase Transaction Agreement. 
Accordingly, both had a pecuniary interest in the transaction. 
2. Sellers And Broker Were In A Superior Position To 
Know About The Litigation And The Second Element 
Was Satisfied. 
Sellers, as party to the Associated Factors Lawsuit, were 
obviously in a superior position to know about the litigation. 
Moreover, the Broker was not only in a better position to know 
about that litigation but actually knew about the litigation and 
persuaded Sellers not to disclose the litigation to Buyers. 
3. Sellers And Broker Negligently Made False 
Representation And The Third Element Was Satisfied. 
The evidence before the trial court established that 
Sellers intentionally represented in the Purchase Transaction 
Agreement there was no pending litigation and Broker failed to 
disclose and intentionally dissuaded Sellers from disclosing the 
pending litigation to Buyers. Given this intentional conduct, the 
lesser standards of negligence and carelessness were met. 
4. Sellers and Broker Expected Buyers To Rely And Act 
On The Representation And The Fourth Element Was 
Satisfied. 
This element is the same as the fourth element of Buyers' 
fraud in the inducement claim and, as set forth supra § I.A.4. at 
p. 21, Sellers and Broker fully expected and intended Buyers to 
rely on the representation. 
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5. Buyers Reasonably Relied On The Representation And 
The Fifth Element Was Satisfied. 
This element is the same as the fifth element of Buyers' 
fraud in the inducement claim and, as set forth supra § I.A.5 at 
pp. 21-22, Buyers reasonably relied on the representation in 
entering into the Purchase Transaction. 
6. Buyers Suffered Loss As A Result Of The False 
Representation And The Sixth And Final Element Was 
Satisfied. 
This element is the same as the sixth element of Buyers1 
fraud in the inducement claim and, as set forth supra § I.A.6. at 
p. 22, Buyers suffered loss as a result of the representation. 
Based on the foregoing, each element of Buyers' negligent 
misrepresentation claim was supported by the record evidence and 
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against Buyers 
on this claim. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
SELLERS' COUNTERCLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 
BASED ON THE FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED PURCHASE 
TRANSACTION AGREEMENT. 
The trial court in granting summary judgment not only 
dismissed Buyers' claims but it also summarily enforced the 
Sellers' counterclaim for payment of the outstanding purchase price 
of the business. This was reversible error as the court enforced 
a contract (and corresponding promissory notes) that were, based on 
the undisputed evidence, induced by fraud. 
As a matter of law when the evidence shows that a 
contract has been induced by a fraudulent misrepresentation of 
existing material fact except for which the party would not have 
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entered the contract, the defendant can avoid liability under the 
contract. E.g., American Scale Mfg. Co. v. Zee, 235 P.2d 361, 363 
(Utah 1951); Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 
634, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("plaintiff in an action for fraud has 
the option to elect to rescind the transaction and recover the 
purchase price or to affirm the transaction and recover 
damages") (citing Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980)); 
Perkins v. Coombs, 769 P.2d 269, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(same and 
noting the choice of remedy belongs to the defrauded party and that 
choice cannot be forced upon him); Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 3 04, 
307-308 (Utah 1979)(same). The Utah Supreme Court's ruling is Zee 
is pertinent to the issues currently before the Court. In Zee the 
Supreme Court reversed a trial court judgment after trial to the 
bench. The trial court did not believe the defendant's testimony 
that the plaintiff's fraud had induced his entering into the 
contract. The Supreme Court found that defendant's testimony about 
the fraud, being uncontradicted, required judgment against 
plaintiff and in favor of defendant on the basis of rescission. As 
this Court explained, "the effect of such remedy is to restore all 
parties to the position they occupied immediately prior to the 
fraud." Perkins, 769 P.2d at 271. 
In the instant case it is undisputed that Sellers' 
representation that there was no pending litigation against the 
business being purchased was material to Buyers and was false. 
Moreover, upon learning they had been defrauded with regard to 
litigation against the business, the Buyers promptly provided 
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written notice to Sellers of Buyers1 intention to rescind the 
Purchase Transaction Agreement.11 [R438, 628, 868] Given those 
facts it was error for the trial court to enter summary judgment 
against Buyers on the basis of the fraudulently induced contract. 
The trial court had no power to weigh the credibility of 
Buyers' claim of fraud in the inducement, but only to determine if 
there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that 
the fraudulent representation had induced Buyers' signature on the 
contract. As shown above, such evidence clearly existed; 
therefore, the trial court erred in entering summary judgment 
against Buyers on Sellers' counterclaim in light of Sellers' fraud. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
BROKERS' COUNTERCLAIM AND ENFORCING AN INDEMNITY 
CLAUSE INDUCED BY FRAUD. 
The trial court not only found that Broker could not be 
held liable on the Buyers' fraud in the inducement and negligent 
misrepresentation claims, but also summarily adjudged Buyers to be 
liable to Brokers because of the inclusion in the Purchase 
1
 In addition to the letter of rescission, at the outset of 
this litigation in their Answer to the Sellers' counterclaim Buyers 
expressly asserted rescission based on fraud: 
The Note which is the subject of the Counterclaim is 
subject to rescission given the conduct of the [Sellers 
and Broker] as alleged in the Complaint which is 
incorporated by this reference. 
[R93] 
While the rescission by Buyers in this case is clear, in the event 
there is any question regarding rescission it is a question of fact 
which would preclude the entry of summary judgment. E.q., Knudsen 
Music Co. v. Masterson, 121 Utah 252, 256, 240 P.2d 973, 975 
(1952)(citations omitted). 
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Transaction Agreement of an indemnity clause relieving the Broker 
from representations or misrepresentations of the Sellers. The 
trial court erred, as a matter of law, in making this ruling as: 
The law does not permit a covenant of immunity 
which will protect a person against his own 
fraud on the grounds of public policy. A 
contract limitation on damages or remedies is 
valid only in the absence of allegations or 
proof of fraud. 
Ong Int'l (USA), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 
1993) . 
The evidence in this case showed that the Broker 
fraudulently failed to disclose the pending litigation and caused 
the Sellers to misrepresent to Buyers that no litigation was 
pending. The Broker's failure to disclose the Associated Factors 
Lawsuit gives rise to a fraud claim as, under Utah law, a real 
estate agent owes a duty to prospective purchasers to act honestly, 
ethically and competently, and is answerable at law for breaches of 
his or her statutory duty to the public. E.g. , Dugan v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980) (citing Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 
279, 373 P.2d 802, 805 (1962)). Thus, real estate agents hired by 
vendors are liable to purchasers under the torts of fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation. Id. Thus, as a matter of public 
policy the indemnity provision relied on by the court in granting 
Broker's Motion for Summary Judgment was unenforceable to protect 
them from their own fraud. E.g., Ong, 850 P.2d at 452. 
Additionally, under the law a party who participates in 
a misrepresentation is liable for the fraud though someone else 
does the actual talking. See Ellis v. Hale, 373 P.2d 382, 385 
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(1962) (party who makes misrepresentation to third party with 
intent it be communicated to plaintiff is liable for fraud)(citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 553)). Thus it was error for the 
court to find that the indemnification provision relieved Broker of 
liability for their own fraud or for the Sellers' fraud which 
Broker expressly encouraged and assisted. 
Even had Broker not acted fraudulently, the 
indemnification provision would not be enforceable as the Purchase 
Transaction Agreement is subject to rescission given Sellers' 
blatant misrepresentations of material facts which induced Buyers 
to enter into the transaction. See supra § III at pp. 29-31.12 
Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law in enforcing 
the indemnity provision set forth in the Purchase Transaction 
Agreement as Buyers were fraudulently induced to enter into that 
agreement. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BUYERS' MOTION TO 
AMEND TO ADD CLAIM OF RESCISSION. 
Prior to the trial court's decision granting Broker's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and prior to Sellers' summary judgment 
12
 Buyers, in addition to immediately sending written notice 
of rescission of the Purchase Transaction Agreement to Sellers upon 
learning of the fraudulent inducement, pleaded rescission as an 
express defense to Broker's counterclaim. More particularly, in 
their Answer to Broker's counterclaim Buyers' third defense stated: 
Any indemnification agreement signed by [Buyers] is 
subject to rescission given the conduct of [Sellers and 
Broker] as alleged in the Complaint, which allegations 
are hereby incorporated by reference as a further 
affirmative defense. 
[R96] 
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motion, Buyers moved the trial court for leave to amend their 
complaint to add a claim for relief entitled "rescission and 
restitution". [R518-520, 586-602] The rescission claim was based 
on the very same factual and legal basis as those contained in the 
initial complaint and, in fact, the factual allegations in the 
amended complaint were identical to those in the initial complaint. 
[592-602] Buyers' proposed amendment was simply to clear up any 
confusion regarding the fact that Buyers were seeking rescission as 
previously expressed in their September 23, 1991 written notice 
claiming rescission of the transaction, [R628] and as expressly 
pleaded at the outset of this litigation in defense to the 
counterclaims of both Sellers and Broker. [R93 & 96] 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs 
amendment of pleadings and provides in pertinent part as follows: 
. . . [A] party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and 
leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. 
In determining whether amendment is proper, " [a] primary 
consideration that a trial judge must take into account in 
determining whether leave should be granted is whether the opposing 
side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue 
adjudicated for which he had not time to prepare." Bekins Bar V 
Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983). The trial court 
erred in finding that there would be any prejudice to Broker or 
Sellers if the proposed amendment were allowed. The factual basis 
of the amended complaint was identical to that in the prior 
complaint and, moreover, these legal issues were present since the 
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inception of the case. Accordingly, no additional discovery would 
be necessary nor were any new issues raised. 
The granting of leave to amend the complaint was 
particularly appropriate here because both Broker and Sellers knew 
that Buyers were seeking rescission of the agreement as Buyers had 
previously sent a written notice claiming rescission and expressly 
plead rescission as a defense to the counterclaims of Sellers and 
Broker. Accordingly, there simply is no basis upon which a court 
could find that the proposed amendment was prejudicial. 
Finally, the requested leave to amend should have been 
granted because rescission was an appropriate remedy under the 
circumstances. As this Court has noted: 
The plaintiff in an action for fraud has the option 
to elect to rescind the transaction and recover the 
purchase price or to affirm the transaction and recover 
damages. The choice of remedy belongs to the victim of 
the fraud, and a choice cannot be forced upon him. 
The complaint filed by appellants pray for recission 
[sic] of the second subordination agreement. They are 
entitled to that remedy. The effect of such remedy is to 
restore all parties to the position they occupied 
immediately prior to the fraud. 
Perkins v. Coombs, 769 P.2d 269, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(quoting 
Dugan v. Jones, 612 P. 2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980) . Accordingly, 
rescission was an appropriate remedy and the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to grant Buyers leave to amend their 
complaint to expressly add a claim of rescission. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BUYERS' MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL. 
Following the trial court's decision to grant Broker's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Buyers filed a "Motion for New Trial" 
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asking the court to reconsider its summary judgment ruling. [R712-
714] The Motion was based on the fact there were material issues 
of disputed fact which precluded the entry of summary judgment and 
the trial court, as a matter of law, committed error in its ruling 
granting Broker's summary judgment motion. [R715-724] Given the 
trial court's improper legal conclusions and, more importantly, the 
court's basing (at least in part) its summary judgment decision on 
the issue of damages which was not raised by Broker until its reply 
memorandum, the trial court should have reconsidered its ruling by 
granting Buyers' Motion for New Trial. At the very least, Buyers 
were entitled to have the court consider the affidavits pertaining 
to damages which were submitted in opposition to Sellers' Motion 
for Summary Judgment (Sellers unlike Broker had raised the issue in 
its opening memorandum). Had the trial court considered those 
affidavits which could not have been filed in response to Broker's 
Motion for Summary Judgment initially as the issue was not raised, 
it would not have granted summary judgment in Broker's favor 
finding Buyers failed to prove damages. Thus, the Motion for New 
Trial should have been granted. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on 
Buyers' claims for fraud in the inducement and negligent 
misrepresentation against both Sellers and Broker. Moreover, given 
the fraudulently induced agreement, the trial court also erred in 
granting summary judgment against Buyers on the counterclaims of 
Sellers and Broker, both of which were based on the fraudulently 
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induced agreement. Accordingly, the trial, court's rulings granting 
si immai: } r ji idgn tent: :i i i fa1! ? • ::»i: c f Se] 1 ers and Broker should be reversed 
and the case remanded for further pi oceedings. 
DATED this day of June, 19 38, 
ATF T T' ' i r i 1 1 
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for Summary Judgment is based primarily on paragraph XX of the 
contract between the parties. Article XX says in pertinent part 
that buyer is relying solely on buyer's inspection of the business 
and the representations of seller, and not on VR Business Brokers 
with regard to the prior operating history of the business, the 
value of the assets being purchased, and all other material facts 
of seller in making this offer. The paragraph goes on to state 
that the broker hasn't verified and will not verify any 
representations of seller and if any representation should be 
untrue, buyer agrees to look solely to seller for relief, and to 
indemnify broker (VR) and hold broker harmless in connection with 
any losses or damages caused to buyer. 
In its response, the plaintiff seems to ignore the foregoing 
contractual provision, claiming that the plaintiff would not have 
entered into the contract, but for negligent and fraudulent 
misrepresentations by the seller and VR, and that therefore the 
plaintiff is entitled to rescission and the terms of the contract 
don't matter. 
The plaintiffs' arguments have no merit for several reasons. 
The agreement was signed by all the parties. The plaintiff 
testified in his deposition that he read the agreement thoroughly 
and understood it. Plaintiff, through paragraph XX, expressly 
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assumed the risks regarding representatioi: is or misrepresentations 
of seller. By this provision, plaintiff expressly relieved VR of 
any legal duties arisina frcr fh>° d^rcribed conduct, i.e., seller's 
representations or .. ..sreprese; . •. 
When the moviro part^ has carried its burden ui.der Rule 56 (• 
the v ""r '"*r1 d "* *~ *~? v--. v-*-- • •****-,-.+- -, •« *>>*f t- -j oi r-> r" , ,r* r")Iv s h r + ^ P^,'. - C; sor^e 
d ; 
forward with specific facts in admissible jorm, shewing that: there 
"
 r
^ * crern i n° i csuc ror tr' .^  ' . The rd =» I p* ~ * r h^^ r rrply failed 
aisrepresentation, there *r ,;o factual averment from tne plaintiff 
establishing even arguable evidence of e^*1 : those elements. The 
same ' *=;:> p t - ...>. • < JL J -,*.. : 
misrepresentation. riaintifr na;-; aisc lailea ^o provide any 
evidence of damages. 
contract, an.i plaintiffs have failed *• v-e: ineir burden 
response t : • defendant VR/ s Motion fen* Summary Judgment. In 
r e a c h I n g t h e s e c o i 1 c ] u s i : • i: :i„ s 11: 1 • = C : i :i :i : t I: :i„ <:= ,„ s :ii E , ; ; = i c „ 111 1 s i :i„, b m i 11,„ e d 
facts and. submissions in a light most tavorable t< * the plaintiff. 
Dated this _day of February, 199V. 
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
DISTRICT.' COURT JUDGE 
RUF, INC, V ICELANDIC INVEST. PAGE FIVE UlNlJ'J'l', ENTKt 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true -;nd correct copy of the 
2 1 „
 o f 
f -.;. • aary, 15 9 / . 
c, . . ,oi« ^. Ross 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
525 East 100 South, Suite ^00 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah S414/-i.*008 
Les-,3 w. Slaugh 
At'.-: ney for Defendants Icelandic 
and Johnson 
120 East 300 Nr * " 
P.O Box 77 8 
Prove 7 * - <.* 
Phillii >\ 
A t t o r n e y f o r L^  • ^ * ^ » n t VP Utah 
Ui S . M a i n , S L . t e j 1 3 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 0 1 
U^dJMJAi^Z 
\ 
TabB 
F v. ICELA\ C SLC 93-3578 Condensclt ( HCH DECISION, 8-4-97 
IN THE THIRD J U D I C I A L DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
P a g e 1 
P l a i n t i f f , 
ICELANDIC INVESTMENTS, I N C . 
D e f e n d a n t , 
< < 
Case No, 93C9C55 7 8 CV" 
BENCH DECISION. 9-4 97 
11 BE IT REMEMBERED that on Che 4th day 
12 of August, 1997, at 10:00 o'clock a.m., this cause 
13 came on for hearing before the HONORABLE STEPHEN 
14 HENRIOD, District Court, without a jury ir. the Salt 
15 La.!«e County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
16 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
F o r t h e P l a i n t i f f : JEFFREY L . SILVESTRINI 
A t t o r n e y a t Law 
; F o r t h e D e f e n d a n t : P H I L L I P W. DYER 
LESLIE W. SLA'JS.H 
; Attorney at Law 
23 CAT by: CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR 
2 4 
25 
1 things that people don't know about that are not as 
2 everybody thought they were when they put together 
3 the list or representations at the start or a 
4 contract? 
5 I'd like Mr. Dyer to prepare orders on 
6 the attorney fee motion, the motion to strike; 
7 Mr. Slaugh to prepare ~ oh, and the motion for new 
8 trial; Mr. Slaugh prepare the motion, the order on 
9 the motion for summary judgment 
: -) I don't — oh, and the motion to amend is 
; i denied. Four years is just way too long, and there 
12 is prejudice and there is delay and there is no 
13 excuse. 
14 Mr. Slaugh. 
15 MR. SLAUGH: On the promissory note, the 
16 Johnsons would also have a claim for attomey fees on 
17 that and I would submit it. 
18 THE COURT: Submit your affidavit. And 
that — this ruling does encompass the promissory 
notes, so they are part of the judgment. 
Thank you, Counsel. 
MR. SILVESTRINI: Thank VOU. 
MR. DYER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Hearing adjourned.) 
Page 4 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: I am goine to go through the 
3 motions, and I 'm going to make some explanation when 
4 I 'm finished. Witn regard to the motion for 
5 attorney's fees, it is granted. I'm going to want an 
6 affidavit that conforms with the Code of Judicial 
7 Administration. There will certainly be an 
8 opportunity to object to the specifics in the 
9 affidavit. 
10 The motion regarding the affidavits is 
11 framed as far as the motion for new trial as respect 
12 to VR's concerned. 
13 Motion for new trial is denied. 
14 Motion for sanctions was withdrawn. 
15 And Icelandic's motion for summary 
16 judgment is granted. 
17 And I think this was explained very well 
is by Mr. Slaugh. When a party makes a motion for 
19 summary judgment and it is properly supported, the 
20 burden on the responding party is a lot greater than 
21 what Ruf or Dudleys have met in their response. 
22 When I said wishy-washy, Mr. Silvestrini 
23 — and that's really what I was talking about -
24 Mr. Slaugh talked about clear and convincing 
25 evidence. It is clear to me from reading the 
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1 affidavits and the deposition that Mr. Dudley did not 
2 rely on it. He likes to talk about reliance, but 
3 he s got to bring to court admissible facts showing 
4 that we've got a case to try. And that's where 
5 Silatex (phonetic) and its progeny as affirmed by 
5 Utah Supreme Court cases... And the fact that trie 
7 Plaintiffs needed to bring to this Court to survive 
8 these motions simply were never even proffered. And 
9 that's absolutely true with the damage issue. That 
10 was raised. That was before the Court. And there 
11 hasn't been even an intimation regarding the kind of 
12 specific types of damages that would have to be 
13 raised again to survive this motion. Plaintiff has 
14 simply tailed to make even a prima facie case of 
15 fraudulent inducement. It takes more than just 
16 evidence in the record. 
17 I think the contract provision regarding 
is notice and cure is essential to any analysis of this 
19 case, and it is also clear that the Plaintiff 
20 completely ignored that provision. That provision 
21 was there for exactly this kind of case. And I think 
22 that cuts right to the core for the argument for 
23 fraudulent inducement. Why is this provision in the 
24 contract if the parties didn't acknowledge that there 
25 are sometimes things misrepresented, omitted or even 
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